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HIDING IN PLAIN SIGHT: JESINOSKI
AND THE CONSUMER’S RIGHT OF
RESCISSION
*

MILAN PRODANOVIC
INTRODUCTION

1

The purpose of the Truth in Lending Act (TILA) is to enable
consumers to make responsible financial decisions and improve
2
efficient use of credit. TILA protects consumers by requiring that
lenders give material disclosures concerning certain qualifying loan
3
transactions. TILA also contains the substantive right of rescission,
which empowers a consumer to rescind a loan for three days after the
transaction is consummated or three days after material disclosures
4
are made, whichever is later. However, the right expires after three
5
years, even if the disclosures are not provided.
The crux of litigation involving rescission under TILA centers on
6
what steps a borrower must take in order to properly rescind a loan.
Section 1635 requires that consumers notify the creditor of rescission
in accordance with regulations promulgated by the agency
7
responsible for implementing TILA. Regulation Z, which implements
8
TILA, allows for rescission through written notice. Yet, the majority
of courts have found that an additional step is required—the
9
consumer must also file suit.

* J.D. Candidate, Duke University School of Law, Class of 2016. I would like to give special
thanks to Professor de Fontenay for her advice, support, and guidance on this Commentary.
1. 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 1601–1667f (West 2014).
2. Id. § 1601(a).
3. Id. § 1635(a).
4. Id.
5. Id. § 1635(f).
6. See, e.g., Sherzer v. Homestar Mortg. Servs., 707 F.3d 255, 257–58 (3d Cir. 2013)
(outlining conflicting views on how rescission is exercised).
7. 15 U.S.C.A. § 1635(a).
8. Regulation Z, 12 C.F.R. § 226.23(a) (2013).
9. Rosenfield v. HSBC Bank, USA, 681 F.3d 1172, 1188 (10th Cir. 2012).
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This Commentary explores the reasoning behind those decisions
in addition to the arguments put forth by the Petitioners-borrowers
(Jesinoskis) and Respondents (Lenders) in Jesinoski v. Countrywide
10
Home Loans, Inc. Part II describes the factual background of the
case. Part III explains the legislative origins of TILA and subsequent
amendments that affected rescission. Part III also covers the circuit
split that existed before the Supreme Court’s decision and discusses
the limitations on the right of rescission, its scope, when and how it
can be exercised, and the effect of exercising the right. Part IV
describes the Eighth Circuit’s holding in Jesinoski and Part V
summarizes the arguments put forth by the parties. Part VI outlines
why the Supreme Court, in the shortest opinion of the term so far,
correctly read § 1635 to mean what is says: rescission is exercised
through written notice, not by filing suit.
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
On February 23, 2007, Larry and Cheryle Jesinoski refinanced the
11
mortgage on their principal home in Minnesota. They obtained the
loan from Countrywide Home Loans, Inc. in order to pay off
12
consumer debt. Bank of America and Mortgage Electronic
Registration Systems, Inc. were assigned an ownership interest in the
13
loan as well. TILA requires lenders to give each borrower two copies
14
of the Notice of Right to Cancel. Countrywide failed to do so, giving
15
only two copies instead of four. TILA also requires lenders to give a
16
disclosure statement to each borrower. Again, Countrywide failed to
17
do so.
Exactly three years after the transaction was consummated, the
Jesinoskis sent written notice of rescission to the Lenders by certified
18
mail. Twenty days passed, but the Lenders took no steps to cancel
19
the security interest as mandated by TILA. Only after three years
10. Jesinoski v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 790 (2015).
11. Joint Appendix at 29, Jesinoski v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., No. 13-684 (U.S.
Apr. 28, 2014) [hereinafter Joint Appendix].
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id.; see also Regulation Z, 12 C.F.R. § 226.23(a) (2013) (“[A] creditor shall deliver two
copies of the notice of the right to rescind to each consumer entitled to rescind.”).
15. Joint Appendix, supra note 11, at 29.
16. 15 U.S.C.A. § 1635(a) (West 2014).
17. Joint Appendix, supra note 11, at 29.
18. Id. at 30.
19. Id.; see 15 U.S.C.A. § 1635(a).
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passed did Bank of America send a letter refusing to accept
20
rescission.
The Jesinoskis sued the Lenders to enforce the rescission and
obtain statutory damages. The district court ruled against them, citing
Eighth Circuit precedent interpreting § 1635(f) to require a borrower
to file suit within the three-year period, and the Eighth Circuit
21
affirmed. The Jesinoskis successfully petitioned for a writ of
22
certiorari from the Supreme Court.
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. Historical Context: Evolution of TILA and Its Right of Rescission
Congress enacted TILA “to assure a meaningful disclosure of
credit terms so that the consumer will be able to compare more
readily the various credit terms available to him and avoid the
23
uninformed use of credit.” Before its passage, consumers struggled
to shop for credit because lenders did not have a uniform way of
24
calculating interest and other fees associated with the loan. As such,
TILA is mainly a disclosure statute requiring that creditors provide
“clear and accurate disclosures of terms dealing with things like
finance charges, annual percentage rates of interest, and the
25
borrower’s rights.” Due to its core remedial nature, TILA is
26
construed liberally in favor of the consumer.
TILA was designed to remedy deceitful and predatory creditor
27
practices on the part of lenders. In response to concerns of predatory
lending, Congress sought to empower consumers with a substantive
tool—something with “real teeth”—to protect themselves; the right of

20. Joint Appendix, supra note 11, at 30.
21. See Jesinoski v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 729 F.3d 1092, 1093 (8th Cir. 2013),
(explaining that the Eight Circuit has reviewed the notice-lawsuit issue and required suit).
22. See Jesinoski v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1935 (2014) (granting
certiorari).
23. 15 U.S.C.A. § 1601 (West 2014).
24. Lea Krivinskas Shepard, It’s All About the Principal: Preserving Consumers' Right of
Rescission Under the Truth in Lending Act, 89 N.C. L. REV. 171, 185 (2010).
25. Beach v. Ocwen Fed. Bank, 523 U.S. 410, 412 (1998).
26. Rosenfield v. HSBC Bank, USA, 681 F.3d 1172, 1179–80 (10th Cir. 2012).
27. N. C. Freed Co. v. Bd. of Governors of Fed. Reserve Sys., 473 F.2d 1210, 1214 (2d Cir.
1973); 114 CONG. REC. 14,388 (1968) (“[A]nother provision of the bill is also vitally important.
That is . . . a series of amendments . . . [seeking] to strike at home improvement racketeers who
trick homeowners, particularly the poor, into signing contracts at exorbitant rates . . . .”)
(remarks of Rep. Sullivan) (emphasis added).
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28

rescission fit the bill. It is a powerful tool that polices the lending
29
process through a set of highly technical rules.
30
Subsequent amendments generally sought to put constraints on
the borrower’s right of rescission. In 1974, § 1635(f) was enacted to
put a time limit on the borrower’s ability to rescind a qualifying loan,
31
even if he received the proper disclosures from the lender. Before
the addition of sub-section (f), § 1635 did not place a time limit on the
right to rescind for those borrowers who did not receive proper
32
disclosure past the initial three-day period. Section 1635(f) capped
33
this time horizon at three-years. Congress passed sub-section (f)
because it was concerned with the risk of clouded title in cases where
34
borrowers rescinded after selling their residence.
The recent financial crisis has thrust the TILA pendulum back in
35
favor of consumers. With the passage of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street
36
Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank), which
28. See 114 CONG. REC. 14,388 (1968) (“I want to emphasize that the rights given to the
buyer or borrower under the conference substitute have real teeth. When the debtor gives
notice of intention to rescind, that voids the mortgage absolutely and unconditionally.”)
(remarks of Rep. Sullivan).
29. See discussion infra Part II.B (explaining mechanics of rescission); see, e.g., 15 U.S.C.A.
§ 1635(b).
30. For a deeper discussion of other amendments that affect the right of rescission, see
Francesco Ferrantelli, Jr., Truth in Lending? The Survival of A Borrower's Statutory Claim for
Rescission, 44 SETON HALL L. REV. 695, 701–05 (2014).
31. Fair Credit Billing Act, Pub. L. No. 93-495, title IV, § 405, 88 Stat. 1500 (1974).
32. 119 CONG. REC. 4596, 4597 (1983).
33. 15 U.S.C.A. § 1635(f).
34. 119 CONG. REC. 4596, 4597 (1983); Hefferman v. Bitton, 882 F.2d 379, 384 (9th Cir.
1989).
35. Scholars such as now-Senator Elizabeth Warren warned that, before the Consumer
Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) took over authority, consumer protection took a back-seat
to banking industry objectives. Oren Bar-Gill & Elizabeth Warren, Making Credit Safer, 157 U.
PA. L. REV. 1, 90 (2008) (“The problem is deep and systematic. These agencies are designed
with a primary mission to protect the safety and soundness of the banking system. This means
protecting banks’ profitability. Consumer protection is, at best, a lesser priority . . . .”).
Congress’s concern that consumers were not adequately protected does carry force: before the
CFPB took over authority, the lending industry had been pushing the Federal Reserve Board
(FRB) to not only restrict the right of rescission, but also to eliminate the right altogether.
Edward H. Wilson III, Column Student Gallery, How CFPB Should Rule Regarding Whether
Right to Rescission Should Be Removed from TILA, 2011 AM. BANKR. INST. J., 52, 52. In
response, the FRB proposed to drastically limit the right by requiring the consumer to tender
principal before the creditor terminates its security interest. 75 Fed. Reg. 58,539, 58,547
(proposed Sept. 24, 2010). The issue was eventually punted to the CFPB, which refused to alter
the rule, keeping § 1635(b)’s consumer-leaning process intact. 2012 Truth in Lending Act
(Regulation Z), 76 Fed. Reg. 79,768, 79,996 (Interim Final Rule Dec. 22, 2011) (“Any security
interest giving rise to the right of rescission becomes void when the consumer exercises the right
of rescission.”).
36. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203,
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drastically reformed the financial system, Congress launched the
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) to “protect families
37
from unfair, deceptive, and abusive financial practices.” President
Obama stated that the CFPB was “a new consumer watchdog with
just one job: looking out for people—not big banks, not lenders . . . as
38
they interact with the financial system.” Dodd-Frank gave the CFPB
exclusive authority over TILA enforcement. Before the passage of the
CFPB, consumer protection was divided among seven different
39
agencies. Congress found this process ineffective and streamlined
40
consumer protection through the CFPB.
B. The What, When, and How of § 1635: Rescission as It Stands
Today
There are many transactions that fall within the province of TILA
41
but do not create the right of rescission. First, the right only applies
to a security interest securing the consumer’s principle dwelling;
42
vacation homes or second homes are exempt. Second, the loan must
43
primarily serve a personal, not commercial, purpose. Third, the right
44
of rescission does not apply to a residential mortgage transaction.
Finally, a mortgage refinancing with the same lender is exempt, while
45
refinancing with another creditor bank is not.
1. When Rescission May Be Exercised
Section 1635 gives consumers the right to rescind a loan until
midnight of the third business day following (1) consummation
(closing) of the transaction, (2) delivery of the required relevant
124 Stat. 1376 (2010).
37. Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, Creating the Consumer Bureau, CONSUMER FIN. PROT.
BUREAU, http://www.consumerfinance.gov/the-bureau/creatingthebureau/ (last visited Oct. 27,
2014).
38. President Barack H. Obama, Remarks by the President at Signing of Dodd-Frank Wall
Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (July 21, 2010), http://www.whitehouse.gov/thepress-office/remarks-president-signing-dodd-frank-wall-street-reform-and-consumer-protectionact.
39. S. REP. NO. 111-176, at 10 (2010) (“The current system is also too fragmented to be
effective. There are seven different federal regulators involved in consumer rule writing or
enforcement.”).
40. Id.
41. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C.A. § 1603 (West 2014) (listing exemptions).
42. 15 U.S.C.A. § 1635(a) (West 2014).
43. Regulation Z, 12 C.F.R. § 226.1(c) (2013); 12 C.F.R. § 226.2(a)(12).
44. 12 C.F.R. § 226.2(a)(24); 15 U.S.C.A. § 1635(e).
45. See, e.g., Keiran v. Home Capital, Inc., 720 F.3d 721, 724 (8th Cir. 2013) (arising out of
refinancing); 15 U.S.C.A. § 1635(e)(1)(B).
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rescission forms, and (3) delivery of the material TILA disclosures,
46
whichever is later. Section 1635(a) therefore automatically enables a
borrower to unconditionally rescind his loan during the three-day
47
period. However, if a creditor does not deliver the material
disclosures and inform the consumer of his right to rescind, the right
48
extends beyond the three-day period. Section 1635(f) limits the
borrower’s time horizon for exercising rescission even if the creditor
did not deliver the required disclosures, providing that the consumer’s
right “shall expire three years after the date of consummation of the
49
transaction.”
2. The Effect of Rescission
When a consumer chooses to exercise his right of rescission, §
50
1635(b) governs the unwinding process. First, the consumer sends
the creditor notice of rescission, which immediately voids the
51
creditor’s security interest. Second, the creditor has twenty days after
receipt of the notice to return any consideration and take any action
52
necessary to reflect the termination of the security interest. If the
creditor does not return the property within twenty days, it forfeits
53
the principle. Finally, only after the creditor has done his part is the
54
consumer required to return any property. If the consumer has spent
55
the loan money, he must tender “reasonable value.” If the lender
does not respond, the consumer can sue to enforce rescission and
56
recover costs and attorney’s fees.
3. How Rescission is Triggered
Both borrowers and lenders agree that TILA enables a borrower
to rescind a loan under the right circumstances. The controversy lies in
what steps must be taken by the borrower within the three-year
57
period in order to exercise that right. A look at the relevant
46. 15 U.S.C.A. § 1635(a).
47. Id. This unconditional three-day right is termed by courts and scholars as the “buyer’s
remorse” provision. See, e.g., Hefferman v. Bitton, 882 F.2d 379, 383 (9th Cir. 1989).
48. Id.
49. 15 U.S.C.A. § 1635(f); Beach v. Ocwen Fed. Bank, 523 U.S. 410, 413 (1998).
50. Id. § 1635(b).
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Regulation Z, 12 C.F.R. § 226.23(d)(3) (2013).
56. 15 U.S.C.A. § 1640(a)(3).
57. Compare Gilbert v. Residential Funding LLC, 678 F.3d 271, 276 (4th Cir. 2012)
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statutory text overwhelmingly indicates that consumers rescind by
“notifying the creditor, in accordance with regulations of the Bureau,
58
of his intention to do so.” In turn, Regulation Z allows consumers to
notify the creditor through “mail, telegram or other means of written
59
communication.”
C. Beach’s Effect on the Current Circuit Split
If the text of § 1635 is unambiguous, then why did the majority of
circuits require suit instead of written notification? Much of the
confusion is rooted in the Supreme Court’s decision in Beach v.
60
Ocwen Federal Bank. In Beach, the Court found that § 1635(f)
completely extinguishes a consumer’s right to exercise rescission once
61
the three-year period ends.
1. Majority Approach: Notice Is Not Enough
The leading case highlighting the majority approach is the Tenth
62
Circuit’s Rosenfield v. HSBC Bank. Like Beach, Rosenfield arose
63
from a mortgage refinancing. Unlike Beach, the borrower exercised
64
rescission within the three-year period by notifying the lender. The
65
borrower received no response and stopped making payments. The
lender, at this point another bank, initiated foreclosure proceedings
against the borrower, who was procedurally barred from making the

(requiring notice only), with McOmie-Gray v. Bank of Am. Home Loans, 667 F.3d 1325, 1326
(9th Cir. 2012) (requiring suit).
58. 15 U.S.C.A. § 1635(a).
59. Regulation Z, 12 C.F.R. § 226.23.
60. Beach v. Ocwen Federal Bank, 523 U.S. 410 (1998). In Beach, the consumer-borrowers
refinanced their home, but stopped making payments on the loan five years after the
consummation of the transaction. Id. at 413. The Beaches alleged that they did not receive
required disclosures under TILA and contended that, notwithstanding § 1635(f), they should be
able to raise the right of rescission as an affirmative defense. Id. The Court rejected this
argument. Id.
61. In often cited and sweeping language, the Court stated that
[Section] 1635(f) says nothing in terms of bringing an action but instead provides that
the right of rescission shall expire at the end of the time period. It talks not of a suit’s
commencement but of a right’s duration, which it addresses in terms so
straightforward as to render any limitation on the time for seeking a remedy
superfluous.
Id. at 417 (internal quotations omitted). This made sense because Congress could reasonably
have believed that an indefinite right to rescission as a defense in recoupment could cloud a
bank’s title on foreclosure. Id. at 418–19.
62. Rosenfield v. HSBC Bank, 681 F.3d 1172, 1172 (10th Cir. 2012).
63. Id. at 1175.
64. Id.
65. Id.
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rescission defense. The borrower then filed a separate declaratory
67
suit seeking to rescind the loan.
On appeal, the Tenth Circuit rejected the borrower’s contention
68
that written notice was all that is required to exercise rescission. It
did so on two grounds. First, it found that Beach was “dispositive” of
the question—notice alone is not enough to preserve a court’s ability
69
to recognize a rescission after the three-year period. According to
the Court, § 1635(f) is a statute of repose that completely extinguishes
70
the borrower’s right after three years. The basis for the justification
71
was Beach, though that opinion never described TILA as a statute of
repose. Thus, TILA established a right of action that is redressable
72
only when the party seeks recognition of it through the courts.
Second, the Court discharged the borrower’s claims based on
73
contract law and the equitable nature of rescission. It noted that
common law rescission is designed to return parties to status quo ante
74
and that rescission under TILA is “analogous[ ] in substance.” The
Court explained that the rescission remedy is not available “where its
application would lead to prohibitively difficult (or impossible)
enforcement” and that rescission should not be available for
75
Rosenfield.
The court was particularly concerned with the potential for
clouded title that may occur if the borrower exercised rescission but
waited an undetermined time before filing suit, during which the loan
could have been sold to another bank, thus impeding Congress’s
76
commercial certainty concerns. Finally, the court stated that the plain
meaning of § 1635 requires written notice, but that written notice
alone is not sufficient—the additional step of filing suit must be
77
taken.

66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 1178.
Id. at 1182.
Id.
Id. at 1172.
Id. at 1183.
Id.
Id. at 1184.
Id.
Id. at 1185.
Id.
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The Jesinoski’s home circuit has also taken the more restrictive
approach to rescission. The Eight Circuit, in Keiran v. Home Capital,
78
parroted the Tenth Circuit’s approach and reasoning almost to a tee.
Kieran is substantively analogous to Jesinoski. In Kieran, the
borrowers showed that they were not given material disclosures by
79
their lenders. The borrowers sent notice, but like the Jesinoski’s
bank, the lender did not respond to the rescission notice until after
80
the three-year period. The borrowers sued for declaratory relief to
81
enforce the rescission.
The court engaged in a reading of § 1635 similar to that of the
Tenth Circuit in Rosenfield and found that § 1635(f) acted as a statute
of repose that completely barred rescission after the three-year
82
period. Furthermore, it reiterated the clouded title concerns
highlighted in Rosenfield and explained that remedial economy
(returning parties to status quo ante) would not be furthered if
83
written notice were enough to rescind.
2. Minority Approach: Written Notice Is Enough
The Third Circuit’s decision in Sherzer v. Homestar Mortgage
84
Services demonstrates the minority, written-notice-only approach. In
Sherzer, the borrowers obtained two loans—one for $171,000 and
another for $705,000—from lender Homestar, which eventually
85
assigned the loans to HSBC. Within the three-year period, the
Sherzers sent notice to both lenders of their rescission because
86
Homestar did not provide required disclosures. HSBC agreed to
rescind the smaller loan, but refused to accept rescission for the larger
87
88
loan. The borrowers sued to enforce the rescission.

78. See Keiran v. Home Capital, Inc., 720 F.3d 721, 728 (8th Cir. 2013) (“Given these
considerations, we agree with the Tenth Circuit’s thorough and well-reasoned opinion in
Rosenfield and hold that a plaintiff seeking rescission must file suit, as opposed to merely giving
the bank notice, within three years in order to preserve that right pursuant to § 1635(f).”).
79. Id. at 725.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 728.
83. Id. at 727–28.
84. Sherzer v. Homestar Mortg. Servs., 707 F.3d 255 (3d Cir. 2013).
85. Id. at 256.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id.
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The court looked to the plain meaning of the statute and
89
explained that § 1635 clearly requires only written notice. Beginning
with § 1635(a) and Regulation Z, the court explained that the text of
both referred to notice as the exclusive mechanism for exercising
90
rescission. Section 1635(b), which governs the unwinding process
post-rescission, also suggests that “rescission occurs automatically”
91
upon notice. Further support could be derived from § 1635(f), which
92
is silent as to the judicial system.
The Sherzer court distinguished Beach, finding that it answers
93
when rescission can be triggered, but not how to exercise it.
Furthermore, it explained that the lenders would not be subject to
clouded title because a notice of rescission enables them to decide
94
whether to unwind the transaction or file suit.
III. HOLDING
The Eighth Circuit swiftly rejected the Jesinoski’s written-notice
approach, explaining that its precedent requires suit in order to
95
rescind. However, two separate concurrences emphasized that this
96
approach was incorrect and that written notice is sufficient.
IV. ARGUMENTS
A. Jesinoskis’ Arguments
The Jesinoskis hinged their arguments on the plain meaning and
purpose of § 1635 as well as congressional intent underlying the right
97
of rescission. Their arguments follow the familiar pattern of statutory
interpretation. First, the definition of “notify” suggests that written
98
notice is sufficient. Second, the structure of § 1635 also confirms its

89. Id. at 258.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 260.
93. Id. at 262.
94. Id. at 265.
95. Jesinoski v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 729 F.3d 1092, 1093 (8th Cir. 2013.
96. Id. at 1093 (Melloy, J., concurring); id. at 1094 (Colloton, J., concurring).
97. See Brief for Petitioners, Jesinoski v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc. No. 13-684 (U.S.
Apr. 28, 2014).
98. The Jesinoskis asserted that both traditional and legal dictionaries define the word
“notify” to mean something less than filing a lawsuit; “notify” merely means to inform. Id. at
16–18. In addition, TILA contains several other provisions, such as § 1638, § 1640, and § 1641,
that also use the word “notify” yet do not require the filing of a lawsuit. Id.
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99

plain meaning. Third, the legislative history further indicates that
100
Congress sought to require written notice only.
The Jesinoskis focused on § 1640, TILA’s damages provision, and
highlighted the differences between § 1635 and § 1640, suggesting that
101
Congress sought to require suit in one but not the other. They
further emphasized that the remedial purpose behind TILA suggests
that Congress did not want to burden, but instead sought to protect,
102
consumers. Next, the Jesinoskis explained that rescission by notice
103
does not cloud title in the mortgage markets. The Jesinoskis also
104
asserted that the CFPB’s opinion should be dispositive. Finally, they
105
contended that § 1635(f) does not bar rescission by written notice.
All it does is require rescission to be exercised through the
106
requirements of § 1635(a), which requires written notice.

99. Id. at 18. Section 1635(a) allowed borrowers to exercise both the three-day and the
three-year rescissions using the same method of notification. Id. at 19. According to the
Jesinoskis, requiring only notice during the three-day period but then requiring suit for the
extended three-year period is “untenable” because the right of rescission is the same in both
instances. Id. Furthermore, § 1635(b)’s lengthy and detailed unwinding process cannot operate
if the Jesinoskis are required to file suit because its procedures are triggered upon “receipt of a
notice of rescission.” Id. at 20. For example, § 1635(b)’s twenty-day return requirement would
not work with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure responsive pleadings structure. Id. at 21.
100. The right of rescission was amended numerous times, yet Congress never added to the
rescission requirement. Id. at 25.
101. Unlike § 1635, § 1640 creates a cause of action, establishes venue, and sets a statute of
limitations, suggesting that Congress knows how to require litigation when it desires. Id. at 22.
102. The Jesinoskis claimed that requiring notice only is consistent with remedial purpose
behind the statute. Id. at 31. In passing § 1635, Congress also sought to codify common law
rescission, which does not require rescission to be affected by suit, only notice. Id. at 31–32.
103. The Jesinoskis reiterated that once the borrower exercises rescission, the lender has
twenty days to decide whether there were any material non-disclosures. Id. at 33–34. If there
were, the transaction unwinds as dictated by § 1635. If there were not, the lender can sue right
away to determine that material disclosures were in fact made. Id. at 33–34. Thus, there will be
no uncertainty in the transaction unless the lender itself creates it. Id. at 33–34. Moreover, even
if there were valid policy concerns, it is not up to the courts to disregard the plain text of the
statute in order to avoid practical problems created by a statute. Id. at 34.
104. This is so because the CFPB is entitled to special deference and because neither the
CFPB nor the FRB has ever changed the written notice requirement in Regulation Z since its
inception. Id. at 35–37. This deference was affirmed when Congress passed authority from the
FRB to the CFPB, which accepted the FRB’s written notice interpretation. Id. at 36–37.
105. Because Beach is not dispositive, the Jesinoskis argued that the Court should borrow
Minnesota’s relevant statute of limitations. Id. at 43–45. Here, the statute of limitations is six
years, which means that the Jesinoskis did exercise rescission in time. Id. at 44–45. Furthermore,
if the Court were to apply § 1640(e)’s statute of limitations, the Jesinoskis would also have
validly exercised rescission because §1640’s one-year restriction also did not run. Id. at 45.
106. Id.
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B. The Lenders’ Arguments
107

The Lenders also began with the statutory text, asserting that
under § 1635(a) there is a distinction between intent to rescind and
108
actual rescission—the latter requires suit. Further, contrary to the
Jesinoski’s viewpoint, § 1635(a) does not address how and when
109
rescission is effectuated. Instead, § 1635(b) and (g) govern the
procedures for rescission, depending on whether the right is
110
disputed.
Congress, by changing the process of common law rescission,
purposefully sought to include the court system in the rescission
process because under § 1635, rescission is not complete until the
111
borrower does his part to return the parties to status quo ante.
Furthermore, the Lenders claimed that § 1635(f), as a statue of repose,
112
completely eliminated the borrower’s right after three years.
Ignoring the clear wording of § 1635, Lenders contended, would sow
uncertainty and lead to clouded title, thwarting congressional intent to
113
clarify the limits to rescission.
Next, the Lenders addressed the Jesinoskis’ statute of limitation
arguments and warned that applying either § 1640 or the “patchwork”
of the fifty states’ statute of limitations would lead to problems and
114
inconsistency. The Lenders also confronted the flood of litigation
argument, explaining that requiring notice would result in more
115
litigation because creditors would be forced to file suit to clear title.
Finally, no deference should be given to the CFPB because
116
Regulation Z does not answer the issue before the Court.

107. Brief for Respondents, Jesinoski v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc. No. 13-684 (U.S.
Apr. 28, 2014).
108. Intention to rescind requires notice only and occurs when the lender actually did
violate TILA; actual rescission requires the borrower to sue when the lender disputes the
rescission. Id. at 21–22.
109. Id. at 23.
110. Section 1635(b) governs when rescission is uncontested, while §1635(g) considers
disputed exercises of rescission. Id. at 23. Here, the Lenders claim, because rescission is
disputed, § 1635(g) should control, and that provision requires the court to grant an “award” of
rescission, which automatically implicates the court system. Id. at 24. This view was expressly
rejected by the Supreme Court in its decision in this case. Jesinoski v. Countrywide Home
Loans, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 790, 792–93 (2015).
111. Id. at 30–32.
112. Id. at 32–34.
113. Id. at 36–37.
114. Id. at 37–38.
115. Id. at 38–39.
116. Id. at 43–45.
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V. ANALYSIS: § 1635 REQUIRES WRITTEN NOTICE, NOT SUIT
The view that a lawsuit must be filed to exercise rescission is
fundamentally flawed for numerous reasons. First, it contradicts the
plain meaning of § 1635 and Regulation Z. Second, it discards
Supreme Court precedent requiring heightened agency deference
under TILA. Third, it ignores congressional intent to make rescission
a non-judicial process. Finally, by placing the burden on the borrower,
it disregards the remedial nature of TILA, which is aimed at
protecting borrowers from predatory loan practices by creditors, not
vice versa.
A. Plain as Day: The Text of § 1635 Simply Requires Written Notice,
Nothing More
The issue of how rescission is exercised begins and ends with the
plain meaning of § 1635. The statute’s plain meaning is unavoidable:
Borrowers exercise rescission through written notice, not by filing
suit. The Supreme Court has stated that the starting point for every
117
case interpreting the construction of a statute is the language itself.
In this case, the statute coherently requires written notice because §
1635(a) requires a borrower to exercise rescission by “notifying” the
118
lender according to the regulations of the CFPB. Neither § 1635(a)
nor Regulation Z requires borrowers to take any action in court; both
refer exclusively to written notice as the sole mechanism for exercising
119
rescission.
In its entirety, § 1635 is unambiguously silent as to the judicial
system. None of the subsections dealing with the right of rescission
make any mention of a lawsuit. In Beach, the Supreme Court
explicitly observed that § 1635(f) “says nothing in terms of bringing
120
an action.” Conversely, both statutes of limitation and statutes of
repose usually refer either to causes of action or the commencement
121
of a lawsuit when circumscribing the time period for initiating suit.
Put differently, when Congress desires to make commencement of a
122
lawsuit necessary to exercise a statutory right, it does so explicitly.
117. Watt v. Alaska, 451 U.S. 259, 265 (1981).
118. 15 U.S.C.A. § 1635(a) (West 2014).
119. Id.
120. Beach v. Ocwen Fed. Bank, 523 U.S. 410, 417 (1998).
121. Sherzer v. Homestar Mortg. Servs., 707 F.3d 259 (3d Cir. 2013).
122. See Keiran v. Home Capital, Inc., 720 F.3d 721, 732–33 (8th Cir. 2013) (Murphy, J.,
dissenting) (highlighting the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and Section 413 of the Employee
Retirement Income Security Act as examples of statutes of repose that explicitly require suit).
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TILA itself is brimming with provisions, such as § 1640, that expressly
123
require suit; § 1635 lacks the same direction.
Only two provisions in § 1635 mention a court and neither address
the issue of whether court involvement is necessary to exercise
124
rescission. Thus, nothing in the text of § 1635 supports the
proposition that a borrower seeking rescission must file suit, as
125
opposed to merely giving notice. Requiring anything more than
written notice would affix additional burdens that Congress did not
126
intend to hoist upon borrowers.
Additionally, the idea that the three-year right to rescission can
only be exercised by filing suit is inconsistent with the way the
absolute three-day right is treated in the statute. If a borrower who
received all material disclosures does not exercise rescission after
three days, his right is forever extinguished; he cannot demand
rescission the following day. However, if a borrower does exercise his
right within the three-day period, the creditor must, “[w]ithin 20 days
after receipt of a notice of rescission” return any money or property
127
that it received from the borrower. Most importantly, after sending
written notice within the three-day period, the borrower may file
suit—even after the three-day period, in which he had an absolute
right, has ended. There is no textual basis for treating the three-year
128
right of rescission differently. Thus, the three-year right of rescission
operates in the same way as the three-day right: the borrower’s right
expires after three years, but if he properly rescinds through written
notice, he can file suit after the three-year period has passed.
B. The CFPB’s Interpretation of § 1635 Should Be Dispositive
If § 1635 is construed as ambiguous regarding rescission after the
initial three-day “buyer’s remorse” period, the CFPB’s reasonable
opinion should be dispositive. The CFPB is empowered with express
authority over TILA and receives “heightened” deference from the

123. 15 U.S.C.A. § 1640.
124. See Sherzer, 707 F.3d at 260 (finding that § 1635(b) and § 1635(g) mention courts but
“shed no light” on what borrowers must do to exercise rescission).
125. Keiran, 720 F.3d at 728.
126. See Sherzer, 707 F.3d at 261 (finding that anything more than notice would graft
“additional, unwritten requirements with which [borrowers] must comply”).
127. 15 U.S.C.A. § 1635(b) (emphasis added).
128. See Sherzer, 707 F.3d at 264 (concluding that the three-day and three-year rights
should function in the same manner); see also Keiran, 720 F.3d at 733 (Murphy, J., dissenting)
(agreeing with Sherzer).
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129

judicial system. This expansive power did not just fall from the sky.
In Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Milhollin, the Court explained that
transactions falling under the auspice of TILA were complex, highly
130
technical, and variable.
“Expansive” authority was given to
implement and interpret the legal framework provided by TILA:
“[D]eference [to the CFPB] is especially appropriate in the process of
interpreting the Truth in Lending Act and Regulation Z. Unless
demonstrably irrational, [CFPB] staff opinions construing the Act or
131
Regulation should be dispositive . . . .”
On paper and in the courtroom, the CFPB has vigorously
championed its position that written notice is all that is needed to
132
rescind. Yet the majority of courts have completely ignored clear
congressional intent and Supreme Court precedent mandating agency
133
deference to the CFPB where the statute is silent or ambiguous.
Section 1635(a) supplies the relevant text, expressly requiring that a
134
consumer “notify” the creditor of rescission. To the extent that §
1635(f) is construed to require its own definition of how rescission is
135
given, the CFPB is responsible for filling the gap left by Congress.
C. Congress Intended to Make Rescission a Private, Non-Judicial
Process Worked Out Between Borrower and Creditor
In addition to finding no textual support, the proposition that suit
is required disregards congressional intent to make rescission non136
judicial. TILA has existed for over four decades. During that time137
period, Congress has changed and reformed TILA in many ways.
Yet, over those forty years, Congress never changed the written notice
requirement in § 1635(a). Most recently, with the passage of DoddFrank, Congress had an ideal opportunity to eliminate or restrict
129. Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Milhollin, 444 U.S. 555, 565 (1980).
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. See, e.g., Brief of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau as Amicus Curiae in
Support of Plaintiffs-Appellants and Reversal at 3, Sherzer v. Homestar Mortg. Servs., 707 F.3d
255 (3d Cir. 2013) (No. 11-4254) (urging the court to find that written notice is enough to
exercise rescission); see also 2012 Truth in Lending Act (Regulation Z) 76 Fed. Reg. 79768,
79803 (Interim Final Rule Dec. 22, 2011).
133. See, e.g., Keiran v. Home Capital, Inc., 720 F.3d 721, 728 (8th Cir. 2013) (disagreeing
with CFPB).
134. 15 U.S.C.A. § 1635(a) (West 2014).
135. Ford, 444 U.S. at 565.
136. See discussion supra Part II.A (highlighting origins of TILA).
137. See, e.g., Truth in Lending Act Amendments of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-29, 109 Stat. 271
(1995).
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rescission under TILA. But Congress chose another path, transferring
authority to an administrative agency whose sole focus was to protect
consumers. This clear signal affirms congressional commitment to
preserving rescission in its present form. Consequently, given TILA’s
consumer-oriented focus, requiring borrowers to file suit would
hinder the very class of people whom Congress sought to protect and
would substantially frustrate the purpose of TILA.
The legislative history also makes clear that Congress intended for
rescission to be resolved privately between borrower and creditor. For
example, in expanding from ten to twenty days the time that a
creditor must refund a borrower’s money after he exercises rescission,
Congress intended to give creditors more time to evaluate whether
the right of rescission is available to the borrower and “whether it was
138
properly exercised.” By placing the burden of initial investigation to
make sure that rescission was properly exercised upon the creditor
and not the borrower, Congress expressed clear intention for
rescission to occur without suit.
D. TILA Was Enacted to Protect Consumers from Predatory
Creditors, Not Vice Versa
At its core, TILA is a consumer-oriented statute—courts have
expressly held that it should be construed liberally in favor of the
139
consumer, not the creditor. By empowering the borrower with the
right of rescission, Congress intended to achieve a specific,
overarching goal: protect borrowers, especially the poor, from
140
predatory creditor practices. And the threat of predatory lending
remains salient today. Congress reaffirmed its concern with the
passage of Dodd-Frank, which amended TILA and sought to
eradicate “unsound lending practices, including predatory lending
141
tactics” on the part of lenders.
142
McOmie-Gray v. Bank of America is an ideal example of
Congress’s justified apprehension. In that case, the borrower did not
receive an important disclosure from the bank—the date at which her

138. S. REP. NO. 96-368 at 29 (1980), as reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 236, 264 (bold in
original).
139. Rosenfield v. HSBC Bank, USA, 681 F.3d 1172, 1179–80 (10th Cir. 2012).
140. See 114 CONG. REC. 14,388 supra note 28 (reiterating that TILA was created to protect
consumers from predatory lending).
141. S. REP. NO. 111-176, at 43 (2010).
142. McOmie-Gray v. Bank of America, 667 F.3d 1325 (9th Cir. 2012).
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143

right to cancel would expire. Two years later, the borrower sent a
144
145
letter rescinding the loan. The lender refused to accept rescission.
Instead, it stonewalled the borrower until the three-year rescission
146
Under the Lender’s view, a bank would be
right expired.
encouraged to delay a borrower from filing suit to evade
responsibility for purposefully or negligently failing to make
disclosures—disclosures that would have enabled the borrower to
better assess his financial position. Such a result cannot possibly be
what Congress intended when it empowered borrowers with
rescission.
E. Rescission by Written Notice Will Not Cloud Title of Mortgages
Despite TILA’s remedial purpose, some appellate circuits
reasoned that because rescission is an equitable remedy designed to
return the parties to status quo ante, allowing a borrower to rescind
without suit would cloud the creditor’s title to the property and would
147
thus disregard Congress’s “commercial-certainty concerns.”
However, this argument assumes too much because clouded title lasts
only as long as the creditor desires. After receiving written notice, the
ball is in the creditor’s court. Instead of waiting for the borrower to
file suit, the creditor can verify whether the disclosures were valid and
choose to negotiate or file suit to clear title. Thus, the creditor will
never find itself subject to an uncertain clouded title without its own
148
acquiescence.
Even if rescission by written notice does in fact cloud title, as the
Lenders claimed, the Court lacks the right to simply discard the text
149
of § 1635. The Court has repeatedly affirmed the principle that
unintended consequences of a statute are Congress’s responsibility to
150
fix, not the Court’s. Consequently, the current majority approach to
rescission is ultra vires.

143. Id. at 1326.
144. Id. at 1327.
145. Id.
146. Id. at 1326.
147. Rosenfield v. HSBC Bank, USA, 681 F.3d 1172, 1187 (10th Cir. 2012); see also Keiran
v. Home Capital, Inc., 720 F.3d 721, 728–29 (8th Cir. 2013) (agreeing with Rosenfield).
148. Keiran, 720 F.3d at 734 (Murphy, J., dissenting).
149. Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470, 490 (1917).
150. Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 79 (1998); Lewis v. City of
Chicago, 560 U.S. 205, 215 (2010).
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F. Beach Apprises When Rescission Can Be Raised, Not How to Raise
It
151

The circuit courts requiring suit based their decisions on Beach.
However, their reliance on Beach is misplaced because Beach clarifies
when a borrower may exercise his right to rescind, but does not
address how he may do so. Beach concerned borrowers who
attempted to rescind a loan but failed to provide notice of rescission
152
to the creditor within the three-year period required by § 1635(f).
The Beaches never sent written notice to the bank nor did they file
153
suit; they simply stopped making payments. Only after the creditor
initiated foreclosure proceedings did they attempt to use rescission as
154
an affirmative defense.
Beach is not dispositive for several reasons. First, its facts are
substantially different. The Jesinoskis, unlike the borrowers in Beach,
timely exercised rescission through written notice within the threeyear period, subsequently filed suit, and did not raise rescission as an
affirmative defense. In other words, Beach does not address the issue
presented in this case. Under Beach a borrower must exercise his right
of rescission within three years of the commencement of the loan or
155
else his right is extinguished once the three-year period has passed.
The Lenders as well as the majority of Circuits are correct that Beach
made clear that § 1635 is a statute of repose that serves as an absolute
156
barrier to “bringing suit” after the three-year period passes. But
Congress never required suit in the first place—rescission is worked
157
out between the borrower and his lender outside of court. As the
Supreme Court highlighted, Beach clarifies when a borrower can
rescind but does not address the vital issue presented here: whether
158
written notice is enough to exercise the right to rescission.

151. See McOmie-Gray v. Bank of Am. Home Loans, 667 F.3d 1328 (9th Cir. 2012)
(concluding that Beach is dispositive but making clear that “[w]ere we writing on a blank slate,
we might consider whether notification within three years of the transaction could extend the
time limit imposed by § 1635(f)”); see also Rosenfield v. HSBC Bank, USA, 681 F.3d 1172, 1182
(10th Cir. 2012) (“[W]e believe that Beach is dispositive of the instant question.”).
152. Beach v. Ocwen Fed. Bank, 523 U.S. 410, 413 (1998).
153. Id. at 413–14.
154. Id.
155. Id. at 419.
156. Id. at 417.
157. Belini v. Washington Mut. Bank, FA, 412 F.3d 17, 25 (1st Cir. 2005).
158. Jesinoski v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 790, 792 (2015).
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VI. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court could have rejected the Lenders’ arguments
on numerous grounds; the legislative history, regulatory
interpretation, and public policy considerations all weighed in favor of
requiring mere notice to rescind. Yet, the Supreme Court did not
inquire into any of these justifications. It declined to do so because, at
the end of the day, this conflict is about a more fundamental
principle—the plain meaning of a congressional statute. And the
Court correctly read §1635 to mean what it says: rescission is
exercised when the borrower provides written notice of rescission to
the creditor.

